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ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION*
Michael F. Urbanski**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Continuing in a groove well worn by decisions rendered over the
last several years, Virginia's federal courts have, over the past year,
continued to demonstrate a measure of hostility toward antitrust
conspiracy claims by regularly disposing of fully-discovered conspiracy claims through summary adjudication. Plaintiffs' conspiracy claims in the health care context have fared especially poorly.
While the Fourth Circuit and Virginia's federal district courts
continued to display a similar hostility toward tying and monopolization claims, the United States Supreme Court's recent decision
in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.' could
stem, if not reverse, the trend in those substantive areas.
On the federal regulatory and enforcement fronts, the Department of Justice has been roundly criticized in a General Accounting Office report for, among other things, its focus on criminal actions of a purely local character. Nevertheless, the Department of
Justice has plowed ahead in its continuing investigation of Virginia's dairy industry.2 The Federal Trade Commission and the
Department of Justice also have issued the first unified set of
guidelines for analyzing the potential effects of horizontal mergers
* This article addresses federal and state legislative developments and enforcement
activities, and antitrust decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, and state and federal courts of Virginia from June, 1991 to June, 1992.
** Partner, Woods, Rogers & Hazlegrove, Roanoke, Virginia; A.B., 1978, College of William and Mary; J.D., 1981, University of Virginia. The author is Chairman of the Antitrust
Section of the Virginia State Bar. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of his
colleagues Francis H. Casola and David A. Clark, as well as James R. Creekmore, MarshallWythe School of Law, Class of 1993, and Deborah L. Winstead, T. C. Williams School of
Law, Class of 1993, in the development of this article. The author also acknowledges and
appreciates the assistance of Frank Seales, Jr., Chief, and James P. Wheeler, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust and Consumer Litigation Section, Commonwealth of Virginia, Office of Attorney General, for information regarding Virginia state antitrust enforcement
actions.
1. 60 U.S.L.W. 4465 (U.S. June 8, 1992).
2. See, e.g., Associated Press, Federal Probe of School Milk Bid Rigging Widens, RicHMOND NEWS LEADER,

Aug. 5, 1991, at B5.
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on competition.3 In addition, on November 1, 1991, new amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines went into effect which
will govern the sentencing of organizations for violations of federal
antitrust law.4
Finally, at the state level, the Antitrust and Consumer Litigation
Section of the Attorney General's Office spent the past year successfully investigating and prosecuting conspiracies in Virginia's
dairy industry involving rigged bids for school milk contracts.5

II.
A.

FEDERAL CIVIL ACTIONS

Sherman Act Section 1 Conspiracy Issues

Since the 1986 Supreme Court summary judgment trilogy was
handed down,' antitrust plaintiffs opposing summary judgment
motions on their conspiracy claims have fared poorly in Virginia
courts. This is largely due to the burden imposed on them by Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio.7 Matsushita requires the plaintiff to develop evidence of a conscious commitment
by conspirators to a common scheme to achieve an unlawful objective. This rigorous standard requires proof which tends to exclude
the possibility of independent action by the alleged conspirators."
1. Cases in the Health Care Context
Perhaps reflecting the increasingly competitive nature of the
health care industry, health care providers have lodged allegations
of antitrust conspiracies with seeming abandon throughout the last
decade.' With rare exception," ° however, Virginia federal and state
courts have demonstrated little patience with antitrust health care
3. See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.

4.

UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

205-08 (1992 ed. 1991).
5. See Frank Green, Attorney General's Office Suing Four Milk Firms, RICHMOND TIMES
DISPATCH, Aug. 17, 1991, at B3.
6. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
7. 475 U.S. 574.
8. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88 (developing the strict conspiracy standard enunciated
in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984) into a hurdle which
antitrust plaintiffs must overcome to defeat a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict).
9. Since 1980, the Fourth Circuit has encountered some fifty antitrust cases involving
claims alleged by individuals or groups of health care providers against larger health care
institutions. See cases cited infra notes 10-11.
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claims.11 Cases decided during the past year are indicative of this
trend.
While the Supreme Court last year in Summit Health, Ltd. v.
Pinhas 2 declined to administer euthanasia to hospital staff privilege cases by expansively interpreting Sherman Act jurisdiction
over such claims," the Fourth Circuit's 1991 en banc decision in
Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hospital 4 effectively signaled the
death of such claims in the Fourth Circuit. The determining factor
in Oksanen was the plaintiff's failure to demonstrate the existence
of a plurality of actors required under section I of the Sherman
Act. The underlying problem for this and similar claims, however,
is the absence of proof of market power necessary to establish the
existence of an unreasonable restraint of trade.
In Oksanen, the Fourth Circuit declined to adopt the panel's
earlier decision5 and affirmed the district court's grant of sum10. See Mahendra Shah v. Memorial Hosp., 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,199 (W.D. Va.
1988) (allowing plaintiff's antitrust staff privileges claims despite prior Fourth Circuit precedent for dismissal). See also Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 912 F.2d 73 (4th Cir. 1990)
(reversing the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's § 1 claims because plaintiff did not have
an opportunity to complete discovery); Advanced Health-Care Servs. v. Radford Community Hosp., 910 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1990) (discouraging dismissals of plaintiff's claims without
ample opportunity for discovery).
11. For cases filed in the Fourth Circuit, see, e.g., Tempkin v. Lewis-Gale Hosp., 1989-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,865 (W.D. Va. 1989), afl'd, 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 69,401 (4th
Cir. Apr. 19, 1991); Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 912 F.2d 73 (4th Cir. 1990); Advanced
Health-Care Servs. v. Radford Community Hosp., 910 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1990); Purnima
Shah v. Memorial Hosp., 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) t 68,198 (W.D. Va. 1988), aff'd per
curiam, 875 F.2d 316 (unpublished decision), 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) V 68,653 (4th Cir.
May 22, 1989); Thompson v. Wise General Hosp., 707 F. Supp. 849 (W.D. Va. 1989), afi'd,
896 F.2d 547 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 132 (1990); Sandcrest Outpatient Servs.
v. Cumberland County Hosp. Sys., 853 F.2d 1139 (4th Cir. 1988); Steuer & Latham, P.A. v.
National Medical Enters., Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1489 (D.S.C. 1987), aff'd, 846 F.2d 70 (4th Cir.
1988); White v. Rockingham Radiologists, Ltd., 820 F.2d 98 (4th Cir. 1987); Coastal NeuroPsychiatric Assocs. v. Onslow Memorial Hosp., 795 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1986); Cooper v. Forsyth County Hosp. Auth., Inc., 789 F.2d 278 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 972 (1986);
Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.
1980); see also Michael F. Urbanski, Antitrust & Trade Regulation Law: Annual Survey of
Virginia Law, 25 U. RiCH. L. REv. 565, 588 n.127 (1991) (acknowledging the plethora of
health care cases brought in federal courts in other circuits over the past decade).
12. 111 S. Ct. 1842 (1991).
13. 111 S. Ct. at 1848-49 (expanding the jurisdictional evaluation to consideration of the
general impact of the restraint on other participants in the relevant market).
14. 945 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 973 (1992).
15. Oksanen, 945 F.2d at 699. The Fourth Circuit, on its first hearing of Oksanen's appeal, had reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment, ruling that Oksanen had
not been given adequate time for discovery. See Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 912 F.2d
73 (4th Cir. 1990).
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mary judgment on the physician plaintiff's claim of an anticompetitive revocation of his staff privileges.
As is typical in the plethora of staff privilege cases which have
recently plagued federal courts, Dr. Oksanen alleged that during
the peer review process the medical staff at Page Memorial Hospital conspired both with the hospital and among themselves to exclude him from practicing at the hospital. Basing its holding upon
the principle of intracorporate immunity,"6 the Fourth Circuit held
that the hospital "and its medical staff lacked the capacity to conspire during the peer review process.' 1 7 The Fourth Circuit also
found a unity of interest (quality patient care) between the hospi16. This principle was announced in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467
U.S. 752, 769-71 (1984) (establishing that because a parent and its subsidiary, or even a
single entity and its officers or agents, possess an overall unity of interest rather than separate economic interest, their unilateral actions cannot be considered the joining of economic
power previously targeted at divergent goals).
17. Oksanen, 945 F.2d at 706.
Consistent with this holding, the Fourth Circuit also held in Cohn v. Bond and Mann v.
Princeton Comm. Hosp. Ass'n that members of the medical staff at Wilkes Hospital were, in
making peer review decisions, acting as agents of the hospital. The court held that they were
entitled to immunity for Sherman Act purposes due to this unitary status with the hospital.
Cohn, 953 F.2d 154 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 120 L. Ed. 2d 922 (1992); Mann, 956 F.2d
1162 (unpublished decision), 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,738 (4th Cir. Mar. 3, 1992). For
a full discussion of Cohn and Mann, see infra section II.D.
In addition, consistent with its earlier opinions in Sandcrest Outpatient Servs. v. Cumberland Co. Hosp. Sys., 853 F.2d 1139, 1148 (4th Cir. 1988), and Coastal Neuro-Psychiatric v.
Onslow Memorial Hosp., 795 F.2d 340, 341 (4th Cir. 1986), the Fourth Circuit in Cohn applied The Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984 (LGAA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (1988). The
legislative history of the LGAA noted concern over an "increasing number of antitrust suits,
and threatened suits, that could undermine a local government's ability to govern in the
public interest." H.R. REP. No. 965, 98th Cong., 2d -Sess. 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4602, 4603. 15 U.S.C. § 35(a) provides that "[n]o damages, interest on damages, costs or attorney's fees may be recovered under section 4, 4A or 4C of the Clayton Act
(15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 15a or 15c) from any local government, or official or employee thereof
acting in an official capacity." This statute was apparently a reaction to the Supreme
Court's opinion in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
See H.R. REP. No. 965 at 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4603.
In Boulder, the Court refused to exempt a Colorado city's actions regarding its regulation
of cable television. The Court was unpersuaded by the city's argument that the Colorado
Constitution delegated regulation of cable television to municipalities by means of its "home
rule" amendment, reasoning:
The Parkerfv. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)] state-action exemption reflects Congress'
intention to embody in the Sherman Act the federalism principle that the States possess a significant measure of sovereignty under our Constitution. But this principle
contains its own limitation: Ours is a "dual system of government," Parker,317 U.S.
at 351 (emphasis added), which has no place for sovereign cities.
Boulder, 455 U.S. at 53.
Because Colorado had taken no position on the regulation of cable television, the Court
held that the city's conduct did not meet the Parker "clearly articulated and affirmatively
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tal and its medical staff.-8 Because of this common interest, the
hospital and its medical staff were legally indistinct and inseparable entities."9 The court held that threatening the peer review process with potential antitrust liability would stifle the incentives
and benefits flowing to the hospital with respect to the maintenance of high quality professional health care service. Congress' intent to provide incentives and protection for physicians engaging
in effective professional peer review also would be harmed. 0
The Fourth Circuit declined to extend the scope of the Greenville PublishingCo. v. Daily Reflector, Inc.21 independent personal
stake exception 22 to the umbrella of immunity created in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.23 The court found that
there was no evidence of a direct economic interest and, further,
that the medical staff did not exercise ultimate control over peer
review decisions. 24 The court also noted that Dr. Oksanen failed to
prove "a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to
achieve an unlawful objective. 25 Mere allegations in disciplinary actions adverse to Dr. Oksanen during the course of the peer review
process were insufficient to establish an inference of an antitrust
conspiracy.26
expressed [as] state policy" test as refined by California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980). See Boulder, 455 U.S. at 54-56.
18. Oksanen, 945 F.2d at 703.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 704 & n.2.
21. 496 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1974).
22. Id. at 399-400.
23. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
24. Oksanen, 945 F.2d at 705-06. The Fourth Circuit expressed concern about expanding
the Greenville independent personal stake exception for fear that it would "swallow the
rule." Id. at 705. The court explained:
Given the force of these criticisms, we decline to extend the personal stake exception
beyond the rationale underlying the Greenville decision. There it was held that the
president of the defendant company could conspire with it where he had a financial
interest in another firm that competed with the plaintiff and would directly benefit if
the plaintiff was eliminated as a competitor ....
Thus, it is unclear whether any
decision to eliminate Oksanen from the market would directly benefit the members of
the medical staff ... We doubt, however, that these indirect economic interests justify a personal stake exception
Because the challenged decision was subject to review by the hospital and because
decisionmaking authority in Dr. Oksanen's case was dispersed among a number of
individuals, the personal stake exception is inapplicable.
Id. at 705-06.
25. Id. at 706.
26. Id.
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Because Dr. Oksanen's only proffered evidence of independent
decisions made by the medical staff outside of the peer review process stemmed from individual choices made in reaction to his own
actions, the court concluded that Dr. Oksanen failed to meet his
summary judgment burden of establishing an inference of a conspiracy subject to Sherman Act section 1 sanctions." The Fourth
Circuit further held that Oksanen failed to establish that the defendants either possessed the market power necessary to significantly restrain trade, or that the defendants' conduct had any anticompetitive effects, both of which must be shown to bring a
section 1 claim.28
The Fourth Circuit curtly rejected Oksanen's Virginia Antitrust
Act claim as well,2 9 holding that it necessarily failed because the
Act specifically provides that it is to be interpreted and implied
consistently with federal antitrust law.3 0 Finally, Oksanen is noteworthy because of the limited period of discovery allowed by the
district court before consideration of summary judgment.3 1
From a discovery standpoint, Becker v. Blue Shield of Southwestern Virginia32 was the polar opposite of Oksanen, yet the
Western District of Virginia also found summary judgment appropriate in that case. Becker was dismissed after more than ten years
of discovery because plaintiffs had developed no evidence of an antitrust conspiracy.
In Becker, plaintiff chiropractors alleged that Blue Shield of
Southwestern Virginia and its physician board members conspired
to deny insurance coverage for chiropractic services. The court
found no evidence in the record to support the plaintiffs' claim,
noting that the plaintiffs had admitted in deposition that they had
no knowledge of any conspiracy. Instead, the chiropractors were
relying "upon a loosely woven theory of suggestion and innuendo
27. Id. at 707-08.
28. Id. at 708-09. This failure to adduce any evidence of market power likewise doomed
Dr. Oksanen's Sherman Act § 2 claim. Id. at 710.
29. Id.
30. Id. (citing VA. CoDE

ANN.

§ 59.1-9.17 (Repl. Vol. 1990)).

31. See id. at 712 (dissenting opinion).
32. No. 81-0320-R (W.D. Va. June 5, 1992) (mem.).
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to support their claim. '33 Following Matsushita,Judge Turk found
such a thread too weak to support an antitrust claim. 4
In Shafi v. St. FrancisHospital of Charleston, West Virginia,"
the Fourth Circuit, in an unpublished per curiam opinion, upheld
the summary rejection of tying and exclusive dealing claims. An
anesthesiologist had filed suit against a Charleston, West Virginia
hospital and the anesthesiology group with which it had contracted
to provide anesthesia services.
Dr. Shafi alleged that a contract between Professional Anesthesia Services, Inc. (PAS) and St. Francis Hospital constituted illegal
tying of the group's anesthesia services to the purchase of hospital
services. Relying on Jefferson ParishHospital District v. Hyde,"6
the court "easily rejected" the plaintiff's tying claim, holding that
St. Francis' eleven percent share of the local hospital services market was insufficient to establish the market power necessary to restrain trade in the tied anesthesia market.3 7 The Fourth Circuit
minced few words in dismissing Shafi's exclusive dealing claim; it
relied heavily on its earlier opinion, Steuer & Latham, P.A. v. National Medical Enterprises,Inc.,3 s for the proposition that replacement of one exclusive contractor with another does not constitute
a violation of the antitrust laws.39 Because Dr. Shaft had previously
been the exclusive anesthesiologist at St. Francis, he could not now
complain that someone else enjoyed a similar position.4 e
The Fourth Circuit's remand of Dr. Shaft's group boycott claim
in light of Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas4" is difficult to square
with its en banc opinion in Oksanen.4 2 The district court in Shafi
had rejected the conspiracy allegations on the grounds that Shafi
failed to provide evidence of an adverse effect on competition or on
the market allegedly restrained.43 While the Fourth Circuit based
33. Id. at 3.
34. Id. The court issued its memorandum opinion within three days of hearing oral argument on the motion, perhaps indicative of its unwillingness to burden the court system any
further with meritless antitrust claims.
35. 937 F.2d 603 (unpublished decision), 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,500 (4th Cir. July
16, 1991) (per curiam).
36. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
37. Shafi, 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,500 at 66,134.
38. 672 F. Supp. 1489 (D.S.C. 1987), afl'd, 846 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1988).
39. Shafi, 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 69,500 at 66,135.
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. See Oksanen, 945 F.2d 696, supra at notes 14-31 and accompanying text.
43. Shal, 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,500 at 66,135.
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its dismissal in Oksanen partially on these grounds, in Shafi, the
Fourth Circuit panel 4 concluded that Pinhas placed the district
court's reasoning in doubt, and remanded the case4 5for further consideration on the conspiracy/group boycott claim.
Finally, in an aberrant opinion, Tempkin v. Lewis-Gale Clinic,
Inc., e the Circuit Court for the City of Salem allowed antitrust
claims deemed meritless by the Western District of Virginia and
the Fourth Circuit to survive demurrer, ruling that discovery
should proceed. Dr. Tempkin, a physiatrist, and his wife, a nurse
practitioner, brought suit under the Virginia Antitrust Act for conspiracy, monopolization and various state tort and contract claims.
Dr. Tempkin's claims arose from his alleged dismissal as medical
director of the physical rehabilitation unit at Lewis-Gale Hospital
as well as from a dispute over patient referrals. Mrs. Tempkin's
claims were based on Lewis-Gale Hospital's alleged delay in granting her privileges, as well as its alleged refusal to allow her to practice under her husband's supervision.47
With respect to the antitrust issues, the Tempkin defendants
filed special pleas in bar to the bill of complaint on grounds of res
judicata, estoppel, and stare decisis, as well as demurrers to the
merits of the antitrust claims themselves. Plaintiffs had previously
filed an action based upon the same facts in federal court in the
Western District of Virginia.48 In the federal court action, Judge
Turk had dismissed the section 1 claim on the ground that plaintiffs failed to make any allegations regarding the hospital's market
power or injury to competition sufficient to state an antitrust
claim. 49 The Sherman Act section 2 claims were dismissed on these
as well as jurisdictional grounds, since the plaintiffs' amended
complaint lacked allegations of a substantial effect on interstate
commerce."0 In a per curiam opinion, the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court's dismissal.5 1
44. In Shafi the Fourth Circuit panel consisted of Judges Hall, Butner, and Boyle.
45. Shaft, 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,500 at 66,135.
46. 27 Va. Cir. -, Chancery No. 89-209 (Salem Cir. Ct. Mar. 16, 1992) (letter opinion).
47. Id. at -,
letter opinion at 1-2.
48. Tempkin v. Lewis-Gale Hosp., Inc., 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,865 (W.D. Va.
1989), aff'd, 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 69,401 (4th Cir. Apr. 19, 1991).
49. Tempkin, 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,865 at 62,552.
50. Id.
51. Tempkins v. Lewis-Gale Hosp., Inc., 930 F.2d 913 (unpublished decision) (per curiam)
1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 69,401 at 65,616 (4th Cir. Apr. 19, 1991).
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Despite the fact that two federal courts had previously addressed and dismissed plaintiffs' antitrust claims, the Salem Circuit Court ruled that plaintiffs' claims were not barred by res judicata, estoppel, or stare decisis because "the primary ground" for
dismissal of the federal court action was lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court reasoned that those portions of the district
court and Fourth Circuit opinions addressing the merits of plaintiff's claims were dicta; therefore, they were not binding upon the
circuit court.5 2 Without addressing the merits of defendant's antitrust demurrer in any detail, the court concluded that discovery in
the case should begin. It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile
the Tempkin opinion with other opinions which have consistently
held that the Sherman and Virginia Antitrust Acts are to be inter53
preted in the same manner.
2.

Other Conspiracy Cases

Virginia federal courts also have rejected Sherman Act section 1
conspiracy allegations outside of the health care context, finding
insufficient evidence to establish the plaintiff's case in each instance. In two cases, Precision Piping & Instruments, Inc. v. E.L
du Pont de Nemours & Co.,54 and Virginia v. Embassy Dairy,
5 6 found plainInc.,55 Virginia federal courts, applying Matsushita,
tiff's evidence insufficient to dispel the possibility that defendants
57
acted independently.
Moreover, during its last term, the Supreme Court declined to
review the Fourth Circuit's recent decisions in Laurel Sand &
Gravel, Inc. v. CSX Transportation,Inc., 5 Sewell Plastics,Inc. v.
Coca-Cola Co., 59 and Oksanen,60 confirming the prevalence of summary adjudication of antitrust conspiracy claims. The court's de52. 27 Va. Cir. at

-,
letter opinion at 3-4.
53. Indeed, despite the state circuit court's holding in Tempkin, the Virginia Code requires the Virginia Antitrust Act to be construed in harmony with federal cases decided
under the Sherman Act. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-9.17 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
54. 951 F.2d 613 (4th Cir. 1991).
55. No. 91-510-N (E.D. Va. Mar. 26, 1992).
56. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
57. See detailed discussion infra section II.E.2.
58. 924 F.2d 539 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 64 (1991).
59. 912 F.2d 463 (unpublished decision), 1990-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 69,165 (4th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1019 (1991).
60. 945 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 973 (1992).
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nial of review also affirmed the necessity of offering proof of market power in section 1 cases.
B.

Sherman Act Section 2 Monopolization Issues

1. Tying Claims
a.

The Kodak opinion

In an opinion which will send shock waves through much of corporate America, the United States Supreme Court on June 8, 1992,'
handed down its long awaited decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Services, Inc."3 Kodak will certainly be heralded
by consumer groups and the plaintiffs' bar as a significant blow to
the exploitative exercise of single-brand market power. It is
equally obvious, however, that the decision will be lamented by
those (including the Kodak dissenters and revisers of antitrust
compliance programs) who view Kodak as an unfortunate perversion of antitrust law motivated by a misguided, though laudable,
concern for consumer welfare. 2
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, 63 characterized the
Court's opinion in Kodak as "yet another case that concerns the
standard for summary judgment in an antitrust controversy."64 He
framed the principal issue to be decided in this way: "whether a
defendant's lack of market power in the primary equipment market precludes, as a matter of law, the possibility of market power
in derivative aftermarkets."6 5
Petitioner Eastman Kodak (Kodak) manufactures and sells
high-volume photocopy and micrographic equipment to businesses.
Kodak's machines are unique in that parts from machines manu61. 60 U.S.L.W. 4465 (U.S. June 8, 1992).
62. See id. at 4468-73.
63. The Kodak majority included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, White,
Stevens, Kennedy, and Souter. Justice Scalia wrote the Kodak dissent, in which Justices
O'Connor and Thomas joined.
64. 60 U.S.L.W. at 4466.
65. Id. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia characterized the issue much differently:
[T]he case presents a very narrow - but extremely important - question of substantive antitrust law: Whether, for purposes of applying our per se rule condemning
"ties," and for purposes of applying our exacting rules governing the behavior of
would-be monopolists, a manufacturer's conceded lack of power in the interbrand
market for its equipment is somehow consistent with its possession of "market," or
even "monopoly," power in wholly derivative aftermarkets for that equipment.
Id. at 4475 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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factured by other companies are not interchangeable with Kodak
parts.66 Kodak provides parts and service to owners of Kodak
equipment at an additional cost, which varies from customer to
customer based on negotiations and bidding.6 7 Replacement parts
for Kodak equipment are either produced by Kodak or are made
to order for Kodak by original-equipment manufacturers
(OEMs).68 Kodak provides eighty to ninety-five percent of the ser69
vice for its machines.
The respondents in Kodak were eighteen independent service
organizations (ISOs) that formed a niche in the early 1980s servicing Kodak equipment and selling new and reconditioned Kodak
parts. 0 According to their customers, ISOs provided better service
than Kodak at a lower price.1 ISOs generally maintained a stock
of Kodak parts, purchased either directly from Kodak or from
OEMs, for use in servicing their customers' Kodak machines. However, some customers purchased their own parts and looked to
ISOs only for service. 2
In 1985 and 1986, Kodak implemented several new policies in
order to limit the availability of Kodak parts to ISOs and to reduce
73
competition from ISOs in the servicing of Kodak equipment.
Specifically, Kodak determined to sell Kodak parts only to owners
of Kodak equipment who rely on Kodak for service or who service
their Kodak equipment themselves. 4 In addition, Kodak sought to
further limit the availability of Kodak parts to the ISOs by entering into agreements with OEMs restricting OEMs' sale of Kodak
replacement parts to Kodak alone. 5
Kodak's efforts to reduce the competitive threat posed by the
ISOs were ruthlessly successful. As a result of Kodak's policies,
ISOs were unable to obtain Kodak parts in any reliable fashion
and, therefore, either lost substantial revenues or went out of busi66. Id. at 4466-67.
67. Id. at 4467.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 4466-67.
71. Id. at 4467.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 4466-67.
74. Id. at 4467.
75. Id. "Kodak also pressured Kodak equipment owners and independent parts distributors not to sell Kodak parts to ISO's" (sic) and "took steps to restrict the availability of
used [Kodak] machines". Id.
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ness." Not surprisingly, the ISOs sued, alleging (i) an unlawful tying of service for Kodak equipment to the purchase of Kodak replacement parts in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act 7" and
(ii) monopolization and attempted monopolization of the market
for the servicing of Kodak equipment in violation of section 2.78
Kodak filed a motion for summary judgment, and after limited
discovery"' and without a hearing, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Kodak, finding that the ISOs had no
evidence of an arrangement tying Kodak equipment to Kodak
parts or service.8 0 As the Supreme Court noted, however, the district court did not actually address the section 1 claim that the
ISOs were making: "[The ISOs] allege a tying arrangement not between Kodak equipment and service, but between Kodak parts
and service.""'
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
holding with respect to the ISOs' section 1 claim. The court found
that disputed issues of fact existed as to whether parts and service
were distinct markets and whether there was an illegal tying arrangement."s On the basis of this decision, the Ninth Circuit considered the next issue, "agree[ing] with Kodak that competition in
the equipment market might prevent Kodak from possessing
power in the parts market, but refus[ing] to uphold the District
Court's grant of summary judgment 'on this theoretical basis' because 'market imperfections can keep economic theories about how
consumers will act from mirroring reality.' "83 Regarding the ISOs'
section 2 claim, the Ninth Circuit held that the ISOs had sufficient
evidence to create factual issues about Kodak's proffered business
justifications and to support a finding that Kodak's conduct was
76. Id.
77. Section 1 of the Sherman Act outlaws "[elvery contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
78. 60 U.S.L.W. at 4467. Sherman Act § 2 makes it a crime to "monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade among the several States, or with foreign nations." 15 U.S.C. § 2.
79. The ISOs were allowed to file one set of interrogatories and requests for production of
documents and were allowed to take six depositions. 60 U.S.L.W. at 4467.
80. Id.
81. Id. As to the ISOs' § 2 claim, the district court concluded that although Kodak had a
"natural monopoly over the market for parts it sells under its name," a unilateral refusal to
sell such parts to the ISOs did not violate § 2. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., Inc., 903 F.2d 612, 617 (9th
1990)).
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"anticompetitive" and "exclusionary" and was born of "a specific
'84
intent to monopolize.
Because Kodak did not dispute that its policy affected a significant amount of interstate commerce, the Supreme Court restricted
its analysis of the ISOs' section 1 tying claim to two issues: (1)
whether Kodak's policies constituted a tying arrangement and (2)
whether Kodak had "appreciable economic power" in the market
for Kodak parts.8 5 The Court reasoned that for the ISOs' tying arrangement claim to survive Kodak's motion for summary judgment, "a reasonable trier of fact must be able to find, first, that
service and parts are two distinct products, and, second, that Ko8' 6
dak has tied the sale of the two products.
To be considered distinct products, parts and service must each
be the object of sufficient consumer demand that a firm could efficiently provide either one without also providing the other.8 7 On
this point, the Court found sufficient evidence of such a demand
because Kodak had regularly sold parts to customers who serviced
their own machines. The very existence and growth of the hightechnology service industry was additional proof of such a demand. 8 Furthermore, the Court summarily rejected Kodak's argument that two distinct products were not involved because there is
allegedly no demand for parts separate from the demand for service. In so doing, the majority in Kodak noted that "[b]y that
logic, there can never be separate markets, for example, for cameras and film, computers and software, or automobiles and tires."8 "
Finally, on the issue of the existence of a tying arrangement, the
Court found that the ISOs had met their burden of establishing a
prima facie case. The record contained evidence that Kodak would
84. Id. at 4468.
85. Id. The Court defined a tying arrangement in the following manner:
A tying arrangement is "an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the
condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees
that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier." Northern Pac. Ry.
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). Such an arrangement violates § 1 of the
Sherman Act if the seller has "appreciable market power" in the tying product market and if the arrangement affects a substantial volume of commerce in the tied market. Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969).
86. 60 U.S.L.W. at 4468.
87. Id. (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21-22 (1984)).
88. 60 U.S.L.W. at 4468.
89. Id.
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only sell parts to customers who agreed not to purchase service
from the ISOs.9 0
Having found a tying arrangement, the Kodak Court reached the
most significant aspect of its analysis: the question of whether Kodak had appreciable power in the tying market." The ISOs argued
that Kodak was able to force unwanted sales of service upon its
equipment customers by the use of its power in the parts market.
The plaintiffs pointed to sufficient evidence of this fact to convince
the Kodak majority of the existence of a triable issue on Kodak's
power in the tying market.92
Kodak argued, however, that even if it conceded a monopoly
share of the relevant parts market, Kodak could not actually exercise the necessary market power for a tying violation. Kodak asserted that competition in the market for copier equipment is so
fierce that if Kodak raised its service prices above a competitive
level, consumers would simply buy office equipment with a lower
service cost from a different manufacturer.9 3 Kodak essentially asserted that the ISOs' theory made no economic sense. 4
But the majority was not swayed by Kodak's intuitively attractive argument. Before considering Kodak's argument, the Court
observed that Matsushita5 demands only that antitrust plaintiffs'
90. Id.
91. Id. The tying market in this case was the market for Kodak parts. The Court defined
market power as "the power 'to force a purchaser to do something that he would not do in a
competitive market.'" Id. (citing Jefferson Parish,466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984)). The Court also
endorsed the definitions of market power contained in Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969) and United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351
U.S. 377 (1956). These cases held that market power is "the ability of a single seller to raise
price and restrict output." Fortner, 394 U.S. at 503; E.L du Pont, 351 U.S. at 391. Finally,
the Court cited, inter alia, Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 17, for the proposition that the
possession of market power "ordinarily is inferred from the seller's possession of a predominant share of the market." 60 U.S.L.W. at 4469.
92. 60 U.S.L.W. at 4469. The ISOs pointed to the following evidence in the record to
support their contention that Kodak wielded sufficient power in the parts market to force
the unwanted purchase of service: (1) some of the parts that fit Kodak equipment are available only from Kodak; (2) Kodak controls the availability of parts that it does not manufacture; (3) Kodak has prohibited other manufacturers from selling parts to ISOs; (4) Kodak
has discouraged independent parts distributors from selling to the ISOs; (5) Kodak has
sought to limit the availability of used machines; (6) consumers have been forced to use
Kodak service rather than the lower-priced, higher-quality ISO service that they prefer; and
(7) ISOs have been forced out of business. Id.
93. Id. at 4469.
94. Id. Kodak cited Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587,
594-95 (1986), in support of its "economic sense" argument.
95. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
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inferences be reasonable in order reach a jury. Kodak, therefore,
bore a "substantial burden" to make the required showing "that
despite evidence of increased prices and excluded competition, an
inference of market power is unreasonable."96 The Court began its
analysis of the assumptions underlying Kodak's theory by observing that the extent to which one market prevents exploitation of
another depends on the cross-elasticity of demand between those
markets, i.e., the extent to which an increase in the price of
one
97
product will cause an increase in consumption in the other.
The Court noted that even if Kodak could not raise service
prices without losing equipment customers, it could still have and
use market power in the parts and service markets. 98 This is true
because "[t]he sales of even a monopolist are reduced when it sells
goods at a monopoly price, but the higher price more than compensates for the loss in sales."9' In other words, "there could easily
be a middle, optimum price at which the increased revenues from
the higher-priced sales of service and parts would more than compensate for the lower revenues from lost equipment sales."'100
Leaving the realm of the theoretical, the Kodak majority considered the two fatal shortcomings of Kodak's theory that higher service prices would lead to serious losses in the sales of Kodak equipment, namely, that "significant information [costs] and switching
costs

. . .

could create a less responsive connection between parts

prices and equipment sales."'' 1 The Court's exhaustive discussion
of the potential hidden costs to Kodak's customers indicates that
the term "information costs" means the costs of accurately determining comparative life-cycle costs of complex office equipment. 02
"Switching costs" were defined as "the cost to current owners of
switching to a different product."' 0 3 The Court noted that "[i]f the

cost of switching is high, consumers who already have purchased
the equipment, and are thus 'locked in,' will tolerate some level of
96. 60 U.S.L.W. at 4469.
97. Id. at 4470 (citing E.L du Pont, 351 U.S. at 400; PHILLIP AREEDA & Louis KAPLOW,
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
342(c) (4th ed. 1988) (characterizing this inquiry as "the degree to
which the [defendant's] sales fall . . . as its prices rise.")).
98. 60 U.S.L.W. at 4470.
99. Id.

100. Id.
101. Id. at 4471.
102. Id. at 4471-72.
103. Id. at 4472.
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service-price increases before changing equipment brands.' 10 4 Because the ISOs had adduced evidence that both switching and information costs were high for the types of equipment and consumers involved, the Court concluded that Kodak "failed to
demonstrate that [the ISOs'] inference of market power in the service and parts market [was] unreasonable. . . .""I In affirming the
Ninth Circuit's denial of Kodak's motion for summary judgment
on the ISOs' section 1 tying claim, the Kodak Court made this final characterization of the balance it had struck:
We need not decide whether Kodak's behavior has any procompetitive effects and, if so, whether they outweigh the anticompetitive effects. We note only that Kodak's service and parts policy is simply
not one that appears always or almost always to enhance competition, and therefore to warrant a legal presumption without any evidence of its actual economic impact. In this case, when we weigh the
risk of deterring procompetitive behavior by proceeding to trial
against the risk that illegal behavior go unpunished, the balance tips
against summary judgment. 0 6
With disconcerting ease,"0 " the Court also affirmed the Ninth
Circuit's denial of Kodak's summary judgment motion on the
ISOs' section 2 monopolization and attempted monopolization
claims. 0 8 With respect to the first element of the offense of monopolization, possession of monopoly power in the relevant market,
the Supreme Court noted that the ISOs had presented sufficient
evidence to withstand summary judgment. This decision was supported by Kodak's control of eighty to ninety-five percent of the
service market and almost one-hundred percent of the parts market. 10 9 The majority also flatly rejected Kodak's argument on the
monopoly power issue, and stated: "as a matter of law, a single
brand of a product or service can never be a relevant market under
the Sherman Act.""' The Court, citing Jefferson ParishHospital
District v. Hyde,"' stressed that "[tihe relevant market for anti104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 4473.
See Justice Scalia's dissent, discussed infra at notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
60 U.S.L.W. at 4474.
Id. at 4473.
Id.
466 U.S. 2 (1984).
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trust purposes is determined by the choices available to Kodak
equipment owners." 112
Regarding the second element of the ISOs' monopolization
claim, "the use of monopoly power 'to foreclose competition, to
gain competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor,'" the
Court noted that the record was replete with evidence indicating
Kodak had taken "exclusionary action to maintain its parts monopoly and used its control over parts to strengthen its monopoly
share of the Kodak service market."11 In light of this conclusion,
the next question was whether any "valid business reasons" existed
that could explain Kodak's actions." 4 Kodak offered three business
justifications in support of its actions," 5 but based upon the ISOs'
evidence that consumers preferred ISO service," 6 the Court found
them unconvincing.
Justice Scalia, in a vigorous dissent joined by Justices O'Connor
and Thomas, argued that the absence of market power in interbrand markets should preclude a finding of market power in
wholly derivative aftermarkets." 7 Justice Scalia reasoned:
The Court today finds in the typical manufacturer's inherent power
over its own brand of equipment ... the sort of "monopoly power"
sufficient to bring the sledgehammer of § 2 into play. And, not surprisingly in light of that insight, it readily labels single-brand power
over aftermarket products ."market power" sufficient to permit an
antitrust plaintiff to invoke the per se rule against tying. In my
opinion, this makes no economic sense. The holding that market
power can be found on the present record causes [the] venerable
rules of selective proscription to extend well beyond the point where
the reasoning that supports them leaves off. Moreover, because the
sort of power condemned by the Court today is possessed by every
manufacturer of durable goods with distinctive parts, the Court's
112. 60 U.S.L.W. at 4473. The Court also stated: "This Court's prior cases support the
proposition that in some instances one brand of a product can constitute a separate market." Id. (citing National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101-02,
111-12 (1984)).
113. 60 U.S.L.W. at 4474.
114. Id.
115. The three business justifications offered by Kodak were that the company had undertaken its actions: "(1) to promote interbrand equipment competition by allowing Kodak
to stress the quality of its service; (2) to improve asset management by reducing Kodak's
inventory costs; and (3) to prevent ISOs from free riding on Kodak's capital investment in
equipment, parts and service." Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 6].
116. 60 U.S.L.W. at 4474.
117. Id. at 4475.
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opinion threatens to release a torrent of litigation and a flood of
commercial intimidation that will do much more harm than good to
enforcement of the antitrust laws and to genuine competition.118
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the majority's use of antitrust doctrine to rescue consumers from manufacturers' exercise of
this sort of situational economic power, the significance of the Kodak decision for businesses and antitrust practitioners is
undeniable.
b.

Fourth Circuit Tying Cases

This year's most interesting section 2 opinions from lower federal courts are a cluster of tying cases. In these cases, the Fourth
Circuit's approach is inconsistent with both emerging Supreme
Court jurisprudence and with its own decisions.
In contrast with the Supreme Court's decision in Kodak is the
earlier Fourth Circuit decision in Service & Training,Inc. v. Data
General Corp.119 Because this Fourth Circuit opinion expressly disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Kodak, it is now of
questionable precedential value.
In this tying case, the District Court of Maryland found that
plaintiff Service & Training, Inc. (STI) had not demonstrated the
existence of two separate products as required to establish an unlawful tying arrangement under Sherman Act section 1.120 Defendant Data General refused to sell or license a diagnostic software
program (MV/ADEX) unless the plaintiff also purchased computer
maintenance services. Although the Fourth Circuit disagreed with
the district court's conclusion that the plaintiff had not produced
sufficient evidence of two separate products, it affirmed the lower
court's grant of summary judgment, finding the plaintiff had failed
to develop evidence of an agreement conditioning the purchase of
the tied product to the purchase of the tying product.' 2 ' The
118. Id. at 4475-76.
119. 963 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1992).
120. Under the Sherman Act, the other three elements of a tying claim are: "(2) an agreement conditioning purchase of the tying product upon purchase of the tied product (or at
least upon an agreement not to purchase the tied product from another party), (3) the
seller's possession of sufficient economic power in the tying product market to restrain competition in the tied product market, and (4) a not insubstantial impact on interstate commerce." Id. at 683 (footnotes omitted) (outlining elements of tying claims).
121. Id. at 685.
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Fourth Circuit held that Data General's actions in selling either
the software alone to its cooperative maintenance customers or the
software along with repair services to its other customers were
equally consistent with permissible competitive behavior and an illegal conspiracy.122
According to the court, Data General's arrangement with its cooperative maintenance customers at most showed that the defendant sold repair services which incidentally included the use of the
MV/ADEX software by the company's field engineers. "It is entirely consistent with a conclusion that Data General lawfully extolled the superiority of its repair services due to its use of MV/
ADEX and that customers independently concluded that they preferred Data General Services using MV/ADEX over [third-party
maintenance] services that do not use MV/ADEX."' 23 The defendant's attractive package, combining the MV/ADEX software with
repair services which utilized the software, did not constitute an
impermissible tying arrangement. Consequently, STI did not prove
all of the elements necessary to support a section 1 violation.
Significantly, in Service & Trainingthe Fourth Circuit expressly
rejected the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Image Technical Services, Inc. v. EastmanKodak Co. 1 24 The Ninth Circuit had decided

that a manufacturer's agreement with its equipment owners to sell
parts only to owners who serviced their own equipment could constitute an illegal tying arrangement. The Fourth Circuit opined,
however, that "[i]t simply does not follow from the fact that a
seller agrees to sell Product A only to a certain class of customers
that it has necessarily conditioned the sale of product A on an
agreement not to purchase product B from another seller, especially where, as here, the particular class of customers to whom
'125
product A is sold have no need to purchase product B.'

Faulkner Advertising Associates, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 26
is also indicative of the unsettled state of the law regarding tying
claims. In Faulkner,the plaintiff advertising agency alleged that a
Nissan advertising policy conditioned the sale of Nissan
automobiles on participation in a comprehensive national advertising program. This program required Nissan dealers to buy local
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id. at 687.
903 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 60 U.S.L.W. 4465 (U.S. June 8, 1992).
Service & Training, 963 F.2d at 686 n.12.
945 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1991).
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advertising from Nissan and its advertising agency, rather than
utilizing local advertising agencies. The Fourth Circuit, sitting en
banc, divided equally on whether to affirm the United States District Court for the District of Maryland's grant of summary
judgment.
Judge Hall, author of the earlier panel's dissent, rejected the
plaintiff's claim based on the fact that only one product,
automobiles, was involved. The judge also concluded: "Faulkner alleges only that Nissan has purchased more advertising in markets
where it hopes to increase sales of its only product, and that buyers of the product must pay a higher price because of Nissan's expanded efforts. These allegations are insufficient to state a "tying"
1' 2 7
claim under the Sherman Act.'
Judge Ervin, joined by Judges Phillips, Murnaghan, Sprouse and
Butzner, disagreed and took issue with the court's willingness to
engage in fact finding. 2 ' Judge Ervin wrote that such fact finding
deprived Faulkner of the benefit of the maxim "that a complaint
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."' 129 Of
course, the equally divided en banc opinion had the result of affirming the district court's rejection of the tying claim.
2.

Recognition of Monopoly Leveraging

In a remarkable opinion where the Fourth Circuit, for the first
time, appeared to embrace a monopoly leveraging theory, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's grant
13
of summary judgment in a hospital downstream integration case. 0
Plaintiff M & M Medical Supplies, a durable medical equipment
(DME) dealer, brought suit against Pleasant Valley Hospital, Inc.
(the Hospital) and its wholly owned subsidiary, Pleasant Valley
Home Medical Equipment Company, for monopoly leveraging in
violation of Sherman Act section 2.' 3' The hospital arranged for
127. Id. at 695.
128. The other Fourth Circuit judges determined that Faulkner was not purchasing advertising from Nissan and that the plaintiff's increased costs merely reflected the increase in
Nissan's overhead. Id. at 695-96.
129. Id. at 696 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-6 (1957)).
130. M & M Med. Supplies & Serv., Inc. v. Pleasant Valley Hosp., Inc., 1991-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 1 69,618 (4th Cir. Oct. 22, 1991).
131. Id. at 66,761.
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patients to purchase DME exclusively from the Hospital's DME
company, without allowing patients to choose DME supplied by its
competitors.13 2 As it had in Advanced Health-Care Services v.
Radford Community Hospital,33 the Fourth Circuit reversed the
district court's dismissal of plaintiff's monopolization,
attempted
34
monopolization, and monopoly leveraging claims.1
Continuing its emphasis on the plaintiff's initial requirement of
establishing the defendant's market power in order to succeed on a
monopolization claim, 135 the Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff
DME company's evidence supported a finding of both (1) the existence of a specifically defined geographic market, and (2) the exercise of monopoly power by defendants.136 The plaintiff submitted
the affidavit of an expert economist regarding the definition of geographic market and the exercise of monopoly power. Although the
district court discounted the affidavit as being conclusory and devoid of supporting facts, Judge Boyle held that the affidavit satisfied the summary judgment standard enunciated in Celotex Corp.
37
v. Catrett.
The Fourth Circuit also stressed the importance of plaintiff's evidence demonstrating that: (1) the Hospital was the only hospital
in the county; (2) the majority of all DME consumers in the county
experience their initial need for DME as a result of inpatient or
outpatient hospital care; and (3) the majority of county residents
used the Hospital for their medical needs.3 8 The court also cited
evidence that Hospital employees were encouraged to purchase the
defendant DME company's products as supporting the plaintiff's
economist's expert opinion."" Given these facts, the Fourth Circuit
rejected the defendants' argument that the economist's opinion
132. Id.
133. 910 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1990).
134. 1991-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,618 at 66,765. The Fourth Circuit granted rehearing
en banc of the M & M opinion and argument was heard on April 6, 1992.
135. Id. at 66,762 ("To prove exercise of market power against a defendant, a plaintiff
must show that the defendant has monopoly power over a product in some relevant geographic market." (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966))).
136. M & M, 1991-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 66,618 at 66,762 (citing Satellite Television &
Assoc'd Resources, Inc. v. Continental Cablevision of Virginia, Inc., 714 F.2d 351 (4th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1027 (1984)).
137. 477 U.S. 317 (1986)(requiring a party resisting summary judgment to set forth specific facts that raise a material issue of fact with respect to each element of the moving
party's claim).
138. 1991-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 69,618 at 66,763.
139. Id.
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was unsupported; instead, the court found that the affidavit was
sufficient to raise a question of fact.
The Fourth Circuit also disagreed with the district court's finding that there had been an intent to monopolize, reasoning that
"the key to distinguishing legal competitive acts from predatory
ones is whether the acts were based on superior efficiency."' 4 Following Advanced Health-Care Services v. Radford Community
Hospital1 4 ' and the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Key Enterprises
of Delaware, Inc. v. Venice Hospital,'4 2 the court concluded that
"the linking of DME to hospital services constitutes anticompetitive activity which may support an inference of intent to
monopolize."' "4
Significantly, in M & M Medical Supplies the Fourth Circuit
also addressed the district court's finding that the plaintiff DME
company's monopoly leveraging claim did not state an antitrust
claim separate and distinct from attempted monopolization.' 4 4
Judge Boyle cited Second and Sixth Circuit opinions which recognize monopoly leveraging as a distinct antitrust theory, 4 5 while simultaneously acknowledging the Fourth Circuit's reservation of
46
judgment on the issue until an appropriate case presents itself."
Again, it is difficult to square the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Oksanen with the M & M Medical Supplies case. Judge Wilkinson
dismissed Dr. Oksanen's section 2 claims, finding that plaintiff
failed to produce evidence of market definition, market power and
monopolistic intent, reasoning as follows:
Although some dispute about the relevant market exists among the
parties, Oksanen has offered little or no evidence to support his proposed definition of Page County as the relevant market. It is difficult to understand how Oksanen can maintain his proposed market
140. Id. at 66,764 (citing Advanced Health-Care Servs. v. Radford Community Hosp., 910
F.2d 139, 147 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing Aspen Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,
472 U.S. 585, 602-03 (1985))).
141. 910 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1990).
142. 919 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
143. 1991-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,618 at 66,764.
144. Id. at 66,764.
145. Id. at 66,674 (citing Kerasotes Michigan Theatres, Inc. v. Nat'l Amusements, Inc.,
854 F.2d 135, 136-37 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed sub nom., G.K.C. Michigan Theatres,
Inc. v. Nat'l Amusements, Inc., 490 U.S. 1087 (1989); Grand Light & Supply Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 771 F.2d 672, 681 (2d Cir. 1985)).
146. 1991-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,618 at 66,765 (citing Advanced Health-Care Servs.,
910 F.2d 139, 149 n.17 (4th Cir. 1990)).
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definition since he himself sent a significant number of patients to
hospitals outside of Page County. As our prior discussion has indicated, we doubt whether Page Memorial exercised market or monopoly power in a market defined to account for commercial
reality.

47

3. Fourth Circuit's Rigid Essential Facilities Test Survives Certiorari Petition
Last term, the United States Supreme Court declined to review
the Fourth Circuit's holding in Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. CSX
Transportation,Inc., 45 thereby leaving intact the Fourth Circuit's
rigid application of the MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co.
essential facilities test.'4 9 The Supreme Court's refusal to review
the standards articulated by the Fourth Circuit in Laurel Sand has
ensured their continuing survival as a tool for the Fourth Circuit's
demonstrated willingness to dispose of meritless claims in summary fashion after discovery has been completed. 5 0
147. Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 710 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 973 (1992).
148. 924 F.2d 539 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 64 (1991).
149. In MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983), the Seventh Circuit outlined the four elements necessary
for an essential facilities claim: "(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a
competitor's inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the
denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the
facility." Id. at 1132-33.
150. In Laurel Sand, the Fourth Circuit easily rejected plaintiff Maryland Midland Railway, Inc.'s ("MMR") § 2 essential facilities claim. MMR, a short liHe railroad, claimed that
the only economically practical means of moving material between two Maryland points
connected by CSX rail lines was CSX's grant of trackage rights to MMR. The Fourth Circuit avoided reaching any conclusion on whether CSX in fact controlled an "essential facility" by finding that MMR had failed to meet the last three prongs of the essential facilities
test established in MCI Communications. 924 F.2d at 544-45.
The Fourth Circuit first found that MMR failed to show no alternatives existed for the
essential facility because CSX had offered to provide rail service to MMR for one cent over
its variable costs. Id. at 544. While MMR contended that this rate would not have allowed
Laurel Sand to compete with Millville Quarry, the court nevertheless found the CSX rate to
be reasonable, in large measure because it was less than what Millville paid CSX. Second,
the court found that access had not been denied because, while the rate was greater than
MMR and Laurel Sand could afford, "the reasonable standard of the access factor can not
be read to mean the assurance of a profit for [Laurel Sand], and [Laurel Sand's] business
for MMR." Id. at 545. Finally, the court found that MMR had not met the final prong of
the MCI test because, given the nature of its business, CSX could not feasibly rent its track
to MMR because part of CSX's business is providing transportation services to "feeder"
railroads such as MMR. Id. at 545.
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State Courts Differ Over Section 2 Demurrers

In two rare state court antitrust opinions, the Fairfax County
and Salem City Circuit Courts disagreed as to whether plaintiffs'
monopolization claims were sufficient to survive demurrer. In
Tempkin v. Lewis-Gale Clinic, Inc., 1 ' the Salem Circuit Court,
without analysis, overruled defendant's demurrers and allowed discovery to proceed, whereas in Trashbusters,Inc. v. AAA Disposal
Services, Inc., the Fairfax County Circuit Court'5 2 sustained defendants' demurrer to plaintiff's monopolization and attempted
monopolization claims but allowed discovery on conspiracy to monopolize and "conspiracy to harm a business" claims.' 5 3
Trashbusters, Inc. (Trashbusters) brought suit against Rainbow
Industries, Inc. (Rainbow) and AAA Disposal Service, Inc. (AAA),
alleging, among other things, monopolization by AAA, attempted
monopolization by AAA, and conspiracy between AAA and Rainbow "to monopolize, divide markets and injure competition."' 5 4
Judge McWeeny of the Fairfax County Circuit Court sustained in
part and overruled in part the demurrers of defendants Rainbow
and AAA.' 5 5
Judge McWeeny ruled first that Trashbusters had not adequately plead a monopolization claim against AAA because
Trashbusters had not alleged a specific market share control by
AAA of at least fifty percent, or special circumstances which might
support a monopolization claim absent a fifty percent market
share. 56 Second, Judge McWeeny noted that "[t]here must be either some indication of market share or other particular market
factors alleged, given the admission of the existence of at least one
other competitor [, the other defendant,] alleged to be or attempting to be a monopolist.' ' 5 7 Because these factors were not plead,
the court then granted defendants' demurrers to the attempted
monopolization claims. 158
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

27 Va. Cir. -,
Chancery No. 89-209 (Salem Cir. Ct. Mar. 16, 1992) (letter opinion).
No. 107091, 1992 WL 132552 (Fairfax Co. Cir. Feb. 28, 1992) (letter opinion).
Id.
Id. at *1-2.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *1-2.
Id. at *2.
Id.
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Judge McWeeny, however, overruled the demurrers to the plaintiff's claim of conspiracy to monopolize. He reasoned that the
plaintiff's failure to allege a specific market share was not fatal to
plaintiff's conspiracy claims because, while market share may contribute to a finding of an antitrust violation, "other anti-competitive conduct" may also contribute to a finding of a conspiracy. 15
Judge McWeeny further rejected the defendants' contention
that Trashbusters lacked standing because the market division
complained of could not injure a rival firm such as Trashbusters.
The court noted that the effect of the alleged conspiracy would be
to "foreclose competition by eliminating plaintiff and other small
firms, providing an injury both to plaintiff and competition."' 16 0
The court in Trashbusters repeatedly emphasized that plaintiffs
do not have to prove antitrust injury at the demurrer stage; rather,
they have only to allege that such injury occurred.' 6 '
While the past year has seen few victories for antitrust plaintiffs,
the Tempkin and Trashbusters decisions perhaps reflect the Virginia state court perspective that antitrust claims should not be
disposed of before there has been an adequate opportunity to develop a factual record. Of course, such a perspective, coupled with
the inability to use depositions as a tool to obtain summary judgment in state court and the prevalence of successful Rule 56 motions in federal antitrust cases, may lead more antitrust practitioners to file claims under the Virginia Antitrust Act'6 2 in the first
3
instance.'1
C.

Price Discrimination

In Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,'6
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected plaintiff Liggett's
predatory pricing claim under the Robinson-Patman Act'6 5 because it made no rational economic sense. Liggett brought suit
against Brown & Williamson, a competing cigarette manufacturer,
159. Id.

160. Id.
161. Id. at *3.
162. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-9.1 to -9.18 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
163. Of course, the fact that treble damages are available under the Virginia Antitrust
Act only for flagrant violations serves as a sufficient incentive for plaintiffs to remain in
federal court. Id. § 59.1-9.12.
164. 964 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1992).
165. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1988).
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alleging that it had engaged in a "primary-line predatory pricing
scheme" 6 in the sale of generic cigarettes . . in violation of Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act.' 6 7 Specifically, Liggett
contended that Brown & Williamson priced its generic cigarettes
below its average variable cost - "to force Liggett either to raise
the prices of its generic cigarettes or to cease selling them" - with
the expectation of maintaining higher profits in the oligopolistic
branded cigarette market. 68 While the jury returned a $49.6 million verdict for Liggett which was trebled to $149 million, the district court granted Brown & Williamson a judgment, notwithstand69
ing the verdict and Liggett appealed.1
Liggett based its theory on the premise that Brown & Williamson could recoup the losses sustained during the predatory pricing
period, as well as earn additional profits, based upon the predicted
behavior of the other manufacturer/competitors in the cigarette
market. This anticipated behavior envisioned that the other four
competing cigarette manufacturers would fail to sell generic cigarettes and would simply stand by and watch as Brown & Williamson drove Liggett out of the market and then raised prices. Liggett's theory necessarily implied, therefore, that the other four
cigarette manufacturers would behave uncompetitively in the face
of a competitive move by Brown & Williamson.1 "
166. Primary-line predatory pricing occurs when a market participant with a very large
share of the market attempts to drive out a competitor by selling its product at artificially
low prices. The predator incurs losses on each sale below its average variable cost until the
competitor is driven out of the market. Once this happens, the predator gains profits which
more than compensate for the losses incurred during the period when the product was sold
at the artificially low price.
167. Id. at 336. As the court stated,
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act [15 U.S.C. § 13(a)] makes it unlawful for a
person engaged in commerce "to discriminate in price bbtween different purchasers of
commodities of like grade and quality . . .where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition . . . or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition" with the person charging the discriminatory prices. The requirement to
show that the effect of pricing "may be substantially to lessen competition" may be
satisfied by proof of predatory pricing.
Id. at 338-39 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988) (citation omitted).
168. Id. at 336. While Liggett alleged that Brown & Williamson sold its generic cigarettes
below its variable cost, Liggett conceded that "Brown & Williamson realized profits [during
the relevant period] in the overall sale of cigarettes in the United States, the agreed upon
relevant market." Id. at 338.
169. Id. at 336.
170. Id. at 340-41.
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The Fourth Circuit rejected this premise. While noting that the
definition of "predatory pricing" is still unclear, 17 1 the court, citing
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 72 stated
that in addition to some form of below-cost pricing, predatory pricing must also involve a "rational expectation of later realizing monopoly profits."' 7 3 As this essential element was missing, the court
affirmed judgment for Brown & Williamson. Liggett did not claim
that a relatively small competitor like Brown & Williamson, which
controlled only twelve percent of the agreed-upon market, could
exercise monopoly power for a sufficient period to reap the gains of
its alleged below-cost pricing in the absence of concerted action.1 4
Also, the court was not convinced that other oligopolists in the
market would simply stand by and refrain from selling generic
brands while Brown & Williamson artificially raised prices of its
generic cigarettes. 7 5 The court noted that it was "aware of no case
in which the predicted economic behavior of an oligopoly was relied on to provide a rational means of recoupment of the losses
sustained in a predatory pricing scheme, and economic logic as well
as actual experience in this case belie such a holding.' 76 Because
"the pricing policies undertaken by Brown & Williamson . . . did
not provide an economically rational basis 'to recoup. . . loses and
to harvest some additional gain,'" they could not be classified as
77
predatory.
On the other hand, in Unlimited Screw Products, Inc. v.
Mam 7 8 the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia refused to grant summary judgment on plaintiff's claim
of commercial bribery under section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman
Act 79 in connection with the sale of shipbuilding fasteners. The
court held that an alleged job offer resulting in actual employment
was something of value within the meaning of that section.
Plaintiff Unlimited Screw, a shipbuilding fastener supplier,
brought suit after it was terminated as a supplier by the Newport
171. Id. at 338 n.5, 339.
172. 475 U.S. 574, 597-98 (1986).
173. 964 F.2d at 339.
174. Id. at 340.
175. Id. at 341.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 342 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
589 (1986)).
178. 781 F. Supp. 1121 (E.D. Va. 1991).
179. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1988).
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News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company (Newport News). Newport News acted upon the recommendation of its quality control
inspector, Malm, after it instituted "stringent, on-site quality audits."'1 0 After Unlimited Screw's termination, Sales Systems, a
competitor, experienced a substantial increase in sales to Newport
News. Subsequently, Malm joined Sales Systems as a quality control manager. Unlimited Screw then sued Malm and Sales Systems
claiming that they had "acted together to disqualify [Unlimited
Screw] as a supplier and to qualify defendant Sales Systems. 8 '
The court considered Unlimited Screw's Robinson-Patman and
intentional interference claims together on summary judgment because they involved similar evidentiary support and a showing of
intentional conduct by defendants. 1 82 "Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act makes it unlawful in certain commercial contexts
to pay or receive 'anything of value as a commission, brokerage, or
other compensation, . . . except for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise.' ""83
Noting that the Fourth Circuit has implicitly recognized the applicability of section 2(c) in "certain commercial bribery contexts,"
the district court held that a job offer to Malm by Sales Systems
which resulted in employment did "constitute something of value
within the meaning of the [Robinson-Patman] Act."'1 4 Thus, the
absence of direct evidence of payments between Sales Systems and
Malm was not fatal to Unlimited Screw's claim. The court denied
summary judgment, concluding that there was sufficient evidence
from which a jury could infer a conspiracy and that Sales Systems
85
bribed Malm with a job offer.'
In another price discrimination case, the Fourth Circuit, interpreting a provision of the Maryland Antitrust Act substantially
identical to section 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act,'8 held that
180. Malm, 781 F. Supp. at 1124.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1129.
183. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1988)).
184. Id. at 1130.
185. Id.
186. The section of the Maryland Antitrust Act at issue, MD. COM. LAW II CODE ANN. II §
11-204(a)(5) (1990), makes it unlawful to
[d]iscriminate in favor of one purchaser against another purchaser of a commodity
bought for resale, with or without processing, by contracting to furnish, furnishing, or
contributing to the furnishing of any service or facility connected with the processing,
handling, sale, or offering for sale of the commodity on terms not accorded to all
purchasers on proportionally equal terms.
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a real estate lease did not constitute a "service" under the Act. In
Hinkleman v. Shell Oil Co., 187 Hinkleman, who operated a service
station franchise of Shell Oil Company, paid rent under the
franchise agreement according to Shell's Variable Rent Program
which was governed by the volume of the dealer's monthly gasoline
purchases from Shell.' 8 Hinkleman was terminated after Shell experienced a series of problems in collecting payments from him,
and he brought suit alleging that Shell was guilty of price discrimination in connection with its lease of the service station premises
to Hinkleman.8 9
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Hinkleman's price discrimination claim, holding that while the Act
prohibits price discrimination through the discriminatory provision
of services to purchasers in connection with the sale of a commodity, Hinkleman's real estate lease did not constitute a "service."
After examining the case law interpreting section 2(e) of the
Robinson-Patman Act, the court determined that the phrase "services and facilities" found in the Act is limited to advertising, promotional, or merchandising services.""0 The court chose to exclude
real estate leases from the prohibition of § (2)(e) because they do
not promote the commodity to the ultimate retail consumer.' 91
Moreover, the court was concerned with expanding the scope of
behavior violative of section 2(e) because such behavior is deemed
Id.
Section 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1988), reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of one purchaser against
another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for resale, with or without
processing, by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to the furnishing of, any services or facilities connected with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of such commodity so purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms.
Id.
187. 962 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1992).
188. Id.
189. Hinkleman also alleged that the franchise termination was in violation of §
102(b)(2)(C) of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (PMPA). The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on this claim, holding that Hinkleman's payment failures constituted adequate grounds under the PMPA for termination.
The court was not persuaded that Hinkleman's payment failures were exempt as "unimportant" failures under the Act. Id. at 376-77. Moreover, the court refused to scrutinize the
reasonableness of the termination beyond the PMPA's language, finding that the statute
listing payment failure as adequate grounds for termination is all that is required to resolve
the issue. Id. at 377.
190. Id. at 379.
191. Id. at 380.
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per se illegal under the Act, without any analysis of its procompetitive effects. 192
D. Antitrust Immunity Issues
In Federal Trade Commission v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.,'
the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of state action immunity
available to provide entities. In Ticor Title, the FTC challenged
the practice of setting uniform rates for title search and related
services by title insurance companies. The FTC charged a horizontal price fixing agreeement and the companies defneded on the basis of the state action doctrine, 94 contending that their conduct
was undertaken pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy and
was actively supervised by the states. The FTC conceded that the
state policy prong of the Midcal test had been met and the Court's
analysis focused on the active supervision requirement. As it had
done recently in Patrick v. Burget,'9 5 the Court held that the mere
availability of state supervision was insufficient to establish immunity, reasoning as follows:
192. Id. at 381.
193. 60 U.S.L.W. 4515 (U.S. June 12, 1992).
194. The doctrine of state action immunity was first enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943), where the Court held that the
Sherman Act was not intended to prohibit states from imposing restraints on competition.
"Although Parker involved an action against a state official, the Court's reasoning extends
to suits against private parties." Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United
States, 471 U.S. 48, 56 (1985). The circumstances under which the state action doctrine
immunizes private conduct were refined in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n. v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980). The Court's opinion in Midcal establishes a twopronged test for determining whether state regulation of private parties invokes state action
immunity. "First, the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed as state policy;' second, the policy must be 'actively supervised' by the State itself." Id. at 105 (citing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410
(1978) (opinion of Brennan, J.)). See also Southern Motor Carriers,471 U.S. 48 (1985);
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
The Court in Southern Motor Carriers took the Midcal analysis one step further and
addressed whether state compulsion is required to immunize the actions of private parties.
Discounting reliance on Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), for the establishment of a compulsion prerequisite to a finding of state action immunity:
A private party acting pursuant to an anticompetitive regulatory program need not
"point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization" for its challenged conduct. As
long as the State as sovereign clearly intends to displace competition in a particular
field with a regulatory structure, the first prong of the Midcal test is satisfied.
Southern Motor Carriers,471 U.S. at 64 (citation omitted).
The Hallie Court applied the "clearly articulated state policy" test to municipalities but
held that active state supervision is not required to immunize their conduct from the antitrust laws. Hallie, 471 U.S. at 47.
195. 486 U.S. 94 (1988).
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Where prices or rates are set as an initial matter by private parties,
subject only to a veto if the State chooses to exercise it, the party
claiming the immunity must show that state officials ahve undertaken the necessary steps to determine the specifics of the pricefixing or ratesetting scheme. The mere potential for state supervision is not an adequate substitute for a decision by the State. 196

The Court was quick to add, however, that this stringent rule was
limited to the horizontal price fixing activity before it and suggested a mroe lenient analysis for conduct which falls short of es17
tablishing uniform prices.
Further demonstrating the increasing difficulty experienced by
physicians in maintaining antitrust staff privileges actions, in Cohn
v. Bond 9 8 the Fourth Circuit dismissed a chiropractic staff privileges case brought against Wilkes General Hospital and members
of its medical staff on the grounds that their actions were shielded
by the state action doctrine, the Local Government Antitrust Act
(LGAA), 199 and the intracorporate immunity doctrine.
The Fourth Circuit found that because the hospital was owned
and operated by the City of Wilkesboro, both it and its medical
staff were immune from suit for money, damages under the LGAA.
The court decided that the hospital's medical staff fell under the
protection of the LGAA because its actions were "'directed by' an
official. ' 20 0 The court noted, however, that the medical staff was
also shielded by Copperweld immunity under its recent decision in
Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hospital.20 Thus, in Cohn the medical
196. Ticor Title, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4519.
197. The Court explained:
This case involved horizontal price fixing under a vague imprimatur in form and
agency inaction in fact. No antitrust offense is more pernicious than price fixing. FTC
v.Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn., 493 U.S. 411, 434 n.16 (1990). In this context,
we decline to formulate a rule that would lead to a finding of active state supervision
where in fact there was none. Our decision should be read in light of the gravity of
the antitrust offense, the involvement of private actors throughout, and the clear absence of state supervision. We do not imply that some particular form of state or local
regulation is required to acheive ends other than the establishment of uniform prices.
Cf. Columbis v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 1344 (1991) (city billboard zoning ordinance entitled to state action immunity).
Ticor Title, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4520.
198. 953 F.2d 154 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 120 L.Ed.2d 922 (1992).
199. See supra note 17 for a discussion of the implications of the LGAA.
200. 1991-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) %69,663 at 67,003.
201. 945 F.2d 696 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 973 (1991). Finally, the court rejected
plaintiff's argument that the medical staff exerted undue influence on the Board, thereby
supplanting its decision. It noted that under Oksanen, the hospital and the medical staff
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staff was entitled to the same immunity as the hospital from
money damages under the LGAA. 2
While LGAA immunity shielded defendants only from the imposition of money damage claims, 03 the Fourth Circuit further immunized the peer review decision from attack by applying the state
action doctrine.2 0 4 The court reasoned that the first prong of the
Parker v. Brown state action doctrine, 0° requiring action to be
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed [as] state policy,"
was met because "North Carolina statutes authorizing municipalities to construct, operate and maintain hospitals. . . contemplate
anticompetitive effects. ' 20 6 The decision indicated the "active supervision" prong of Parker was inapplicable because the medical
staff acted as agents of Wilkes in making recommendations
whether to grant privileges. 0 7
The Fourth Circuit rejected another staff privilege claim in
Mann v. Princeton Community Hospital Ass'n.20 8 There after having been denied staff privileges as a pediatrician at Princeton Community Hospital, Mann sued the facility, its medical staff and five
physicians alleging antitrust violations. The court summarily rejected Dr. Mann's section 1 claim on the basis that Oksanen had
20
established medical staff immunity from antitrust challenges.
The court also found insufficient evidence that two competing physicians, with the help of the hospital, conspired to monopolize the
pediatric medicine market. Instead, the court found that those
physicians were merely carrying out their duties to deny or to
grant privileges under established hospital procedures. 10
were one entity which could not conspire with itself based upon the intracorporate immunity doctrine. The logical extension of the court's holding in Oksanen is that Wilkes and the
medical staff, as a single entity, could not unduly influence itself. The plaintiffs undue influence argument, therefore, was irrelevant.
202. 953 at 155.
203. Id. at 158.
204. Id. at 158-59.
205. See supra note 17.
206. 953 F.2d at 158 (quoting Coastal Neuro-Psychiatric Assocs. v. Onslow Memorial
Hosp., 795 F.2d 340, 341 (4th Cir. 1986).
207. Id. (citing Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46 (1985)).
208. 956 F.2d 1162 (unpublished decision), 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1169,738 (4th Cir.
Mar. 3, 1992).
209. Id. at 67,353.
210. Id. at 67,354.
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623

E. Procedure and Evidence
1. Procedure
Consistent with its treatment of antitrust claims over the past
several years, the Fourth Circuit continues to have little difficulty
affirming summary judgment when it deems that a plaintiff has
had sufficient opportunity for discovery.
In Mann v. Princeton Community Hospital Ass'n,21' for example, the court dismissed Mann's contention that the district court
prematurely granted summary judgment because discovery was incomplete. The Fourth Circuit found that Mann had a full opportunity for complete discovery, noting that during one full year of discovery he had taken only two depositions. In addition, Mann failed
to respond to the defendant's motion for summary judgment in a
timely manner. Instead, one day after Mann's response was due, he
moved for an extension of time in which to respond, claiming that
affidavits of certain lay witnesses were forthcoming. These affidavits were supposed to establish the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact. However, no such affidavits were ever produced.212
Therefore, the court found meritless plaintiff's claim that summary
judgment was premature. 1
Similarly, in Cohn v. Bond,' 4 another staff privileges case, the
Fourth Circuit found the hospital and medical staff immune under
the LGAA, the state action doctrine, and the intracorporate immunity doctrine. In the court's opinion, there was no need for further
discovery of closed-door sessions of the hospital board meetings in
an attempt to develop evidence'of conspiracy and undue influence,
since such evidence was irrelevant. The decision noted that discov'
ery should not become a "fishing expedition."215
The lack of discovery allowed to the plaintiff in Oksanen v. Page
Memorial Hospital21 formed the basis for the en banc dissent to
the Fourth Circuit's opinion. In that case, the fact that discovery
had proceeded for only four months prior to being stayed by the
211. 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 69,738 (4th Cir. Mar. 3, 1992).
212. Id. at 67,353.
213. Id.
214. 953 F.2d 154 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 120 L.Ed. 2d 922 (1992).
215. Id. at 159. (citing Sandcrest Outpatient Servs. v. Cumberland City, 853 F.2d 1139,
1146 (4th Cir. 1988)).
216. 945 F.2d 696 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 973 (1991).
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district court did not dissuade the majority of Fourth Circuit
judges from granting summary judgment.21 7
While the Fourth Circuit has decried discovery proceedings
which are mere "fishing expeditions," the Circuit Court for the
City of Salem has apparently allowed such a proceeding. In
Tempkin v. Lewis-Gale Clinic, Inc.,21 8 the circuit court refused to
dismiss, on demurrer, antitrust claims previously deemed meritless
by two separate federal courts.2 19
2.

Evidence

Consistent with the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Corp.220 and Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co. v. Zenith Radio,22 Virginia's federal courts have skeptically
viewed alleged evidence of conspiracy. For example, in Precision
Piping and Instruments, Inc. v. E. L du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 2 22 the Fourth Circuit upheld the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of West Virginia's exclusion of alleged hearsay
statements of co-conspirators. Precision Piping and Instruments
(PPI), a West Virginia pipefitting contractor, was a member of
PMCA, a trade association for unionized construction workers,
which was negotiating a union contract pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement.2 2 ' When PPI communicated an interest in
bargaining on its own, directors of PMCA and du Pont allegedly
warned PPI that it would be "through in th[e] valley" if it did
4
22

SO.

Despite these warnings, PPI was successful in reaching a separate agreement with the local union. PPI alleged that as a result of
this contract, du Pont and Borg-Warner, with whom PPI did most
217. At the opposite end of the discovery spectrum, Judge Turk granted summary judgment in Becker v. Blue Shield of Southwestern Virginia, No. 81-0320-R (W.D. Va. June 5,
1992), after ten and one-half years of discovery, certainly an ample period under any
standard.
218.
27 Va. Cir. -, Chancery No. 89-209 (Salem Cir. Ct., Mar. 16, 1992), discussed at
supra Section II.A.
219. See Tempkin v. Lewis-Gale Hosp., Inc., 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,401 at 65,615
(4th Cir. Apr. 19, 1991), aff'g 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,865 at 62,548 (W.D. Va. Nov.
22, 1989).
220. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
221. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
222. 951 F.2d 613 (4th Cir. 1991).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 616.
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of its business, 22 5 terminated all business relations. 226 Applying

Matsushita, Judge Sprouse upheld the district court's grant of a
directed verdict for defendants was proper.227 The Fourth Circuit's
decision was based on PPI's failure to dispel evidence suggesting
the defendants' acts were independent, and PPI's inability to present evidence establishing that any individual defendant was influenced by the decisions and actions of any other defendant.
Judge Sprouse also reviewed the propriety of the district court's
exclusion of statements offered by PPI as evidence of the existence
of a conspiracy. During the trial, PPI sought to introduce the testimony of its president and superintendent regarding conversations
these officers had with the defendants. 2 8 The district court deter-

mined that such hearsay statements were not admissible under
Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) 229 or 801(d)(2)(E) 230 and
excluded the statements.2 3 1 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dis-

trict court's exclusion and held that the lower district court did not
abuse its discretion in determining whether the statements were
made within the scope of employment. 23 2 The district court's pre-

liminary determination of whether a conspiracy existed, as required under Federal Rule of-Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), also was not
clearly erroneous.233
" Judge Doumar
Similarly, in Virginia v. Embassy Dairy, Inc.2 34
refused to infer a conspiracy in the absence of direct evidence. The
only proof offered by the plaintiff was expert statistical testimony
that the defendant's bidding patterns strongly suggested the existence of a bid-rigging scheme.

The case was brought by Virginia's Attorney General, on behalf
of school boards in Tidewater and Central Virginia, against five
dairies for their alleged participation in a conspiracy to allocate
225. Id. at 615-16.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 618.
228. Id. at 616.
229. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D) provides that certain statements are admissible if the
statement is offered against the party and is made by the party's agent concerning a matter
within the scope of the agency or employment.

230. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) provides that statements made in the course of and in
furtherance of a conspiracy are admissible.
231. 951 F.2d at 616.
232. Id. at 620.
233. Id. at 621.
234. No. 91-510-N, slip op. (E.D. Va. Mar. 25, 1992).
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school milk contracts by prearranging bid offerings in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 59.1-9.5 of the Virginia
Antitrust Act.23 Embassy Dairy moved for summary judgment on
the grounds that the Commonwealth had not proffered evidence
sufficiently proving either the existence of
a conspiracy or Em23 6
bassy's participation in such a conspiracy.
The Attorney General offered no direct evidence of a conspiracy
involving Embassy. Instead, the prosecution's argument relied
upon a statistical model (the McClave Model) that was developed
by an expert statistician. This model allegedly demonstrated bidding patterns which suggested the existence of a bid-rigging
scheme.2 37 Although acknowledging that this form of circumstantial evidence is relevant to determining the existence of a conspiracy,238 the court found that the Commonwealth's statistical evidence did not sufficiently exclude the possibility that Embassy
acted independently.2 3 9
Most importantly, the court found the prosecution's evidence
wanting primarily because it assumed that Embassy was responsible for actions taken by the Southland Corporation. However, Embassy had merely purchased certain assets from Southland. Because Embassy could not be held liable for actions taken by
Southland on this basis, the court decided it was "improper to accord substantial probative value" to the Commonwealth's statistical evidence. 24 0 The court also sharply criticized the Commonwealth's expert's data and analysis, finding it substantially lacking
and unsatisfactory regarding Embassy's relative costs and market
share analyses. 2 4
Evidentiary issues also dominated the defendant moving company's appeal in United States v. Allen's Moving & Storage,
Inc. 242 The defendants were convicted of fixing the price of discounted moving services to military bases. The Fourth Circuit determined that the government was properly permitted to call a
military officer as a rebuttal witness where that action arguably vi235. Id. at 1-3.
236. Id. at 6-7.
237. Id. at 10.
238. Id. at 10 (citing Theatre Enters. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540
(1954)).
239. Id. at 10-11.
240. Id. at 11.
241. Id. at 14.
242. No. 90-5824 (4th Cir. June 28, 1991) (unpublished) (text available in WESTLAW).
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olated the pretrial stipulation of the parties and the Federal Rules
244
of Evidence.2 43 The court also rejected defendants' arguments
that the government withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of
Brady v. Maryland,2 45 that the jury was improperly instructed that
the defendants' challenged conduct was per se illegal, 4 6 and that
the jury instructions failed to require a finding that defendants
had a specific intent to violate the law.247 The Fourth Circuit also
concluded the indictment was sufficientlk precise to avoid claims of
double jeopardy.4 8
III.

FEDERAL REGULATORY, ADMINISTRATIVE AND ENFORCEMENT

EFFORTS

While the Department of Justice (DOJ) has been criticized this
year for its weak enforcement efforts, including those involving
purely local criminal actions, the DOJ has investigated Virginia
dairies, dropped its inquiry regarding an alleged information exchange among Virginia colleges and, along with the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), issued new unified merger guidelines.
A.

Criminal Enforcement Efforts

The General Accounting Office issued a report at the end of 1991
providing a glimpse of the Department of Justice's criminal enforcement efforts. 249 The report revealed 198 complaints and leads
uninvestigated by the DOJ and a decline in the total number of
investigations and in Sherman Act investigations initiated by the
Division between 1986 and 1990. The report has resulted in criticism of the DOJ's record keeping practices and use of its resources
to investigate matters which are purely local, such as bid rigging in
antique furniture auctions, among local roof contractors, and on
milk sales to local school districts.2 50
243. Id. at *6.
244. Id. at *9.
245. 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution").
246. No. 90-5824, at *10.
247. Id. at *12.
248. Id. at *13.
249. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFIcE, Rep. No. B-241053 (1991).
250. See 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 137 (Feb. 6, 1992).
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Despite such criticism, the DOJ continued its investigation into
the bidding practices of Virginia's milk industry. In the first Virginia school milk case, filed in the summer of 1991, Douglas
Stamper, Vice President and Virginia Regional Manager of LandO-Sun Dairies, pled guilty to conspiracy to rig school milk bids.
Stamper was fined fifteen thousand dollars and was given a oneyear suspended jail sentence in addition to three years
probation.2 "
In a related case, United States v. Pet, Inc.,2 52 Pet pled guilty to
school bid rigging charges and was fined six hundred and fifty
thousand dollars. Pet also paid one hundred thousand dollars in
civil penalties and damages to the United States as a result of
these charges. On November 12, 1991, Marva Maid, a dairy cooperative, was convicted of one count of conspiracy to rig bids to Virginia schools and two counts of mail fraud. The dairy was fined
over one million dollars. Count four of the Marva Maid indictment, however, charging a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false
statements), was dismissed.2 5 Finally, in April 1992, Joseph C.
Hughes, general manager of Birtcherd Dairies, Inc. from 1973 to
1986, was acquitted after trial on charges of perjury and obstruction of justice in connection with the school milk investigation. 54
This was the first perjury and obstruction of justice case brought
involving the forty-five filed criminal milk conspiracy cases. 255
On another front, because of a DOJ investigation into the pricing practices of tuition, financial aid, and faculty salaries at Ivy
League schools, the United States entered into a consent decree
with several schools.2 56 In the consent decree, the universities did
not admit any wrongdoing, but agreed not to collude on tuition,
financial aid, and salaries in the future. 57 At the same time, the
DOJ quietly closed its similar investigation regarding similar practices among certain Virginia colleges and universities.
251. United States v. Stamper, Crim. No. 91-73N (E.D. Va. May 9, 1991).
252. Crim. No. 91-138-N (E.D. Va. 1991).
253. United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Coop. Ass'n, Crim. No. 91120-N (E.D. Va., filed July 30, 1991).
254. United States v. Hughes, Crim. No. 92-25N (E.D. Va. Apr. 27, 1992) (acquittal
entered).
255. Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 45,092, at 44,582 (June 9, 1992).
256. Gary Putka, Ivy League Discussions on Finances Extended to Tuition and Salaries,
WALL ST. J., May 8, 1992, at Al.
257. Id.
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B. New DOJIFTC Unified Merger Guidelines
On April 2, 1992, the Department of Justice and the FTC issued
their eagerly awaited first set of unified guidelines for analyzing
horizontal mergers.25 The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (the
1992 Guidelines), replace the FTC's June 14, 1982 Statement Concerning Horizontal Mergers and DOJ's June 14, 1984 Merger
Guidelines. The new guidelines represent the first regulatory
scheme where the two agencies responsible for federal antitrust
merger enforcement have arrived at a mutually agreeable and comprehensive approach to evaluating the antitrust implications of
mergers.
According to remarks by Antitrust section head James F. Rill in
his speech to the ABA Section of Antitrust Law at the Section's
spring meeting,259 the framework of the 1992 Guidelines consists of
five steps, each treated by a chapter which the government considers necessary. Taken together, the Guidelines are sufficient to determine whether a merger is likely to bolster the exercise of market
power. The five basic chapters concern (1) market definition, measurement and concentration; (2) potential adverse competitive effects; (3) entry analysis; (4) efficiencies; and (5) failure of existing
assets. 2 0 By comparison, the 1984 Merger Guidelines contained
chapters on purpose and underlying policy assumptions, market
definition and measurement, horizontal mergers, horizontal effect
from non-horizontal mergers, and defenses.26 '
Treatment of market definition remains largely unchanged in
the 1992 Guidelines, although the government will now focus solely
on demand substitution factors.262 The treatment of market measurement and market concentration, however, is somewhat revised.
For example, the new guidelines take a broader view of who should
be included as market participants in order to encompass all entities affecting competitive interaction surrounding mergers.26 3
258. Justice Department, FTC Issue Unified Federal Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers,
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1559 (Special Supp., Apr. 2, 1992) [hereinafter
1992 Guidelines]. These new guidelines update the Merger Guidelines released by the Department of Justice in 1984 [hereinafter 1984 Guidelines].
259. Speech by James F. Rill to ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1560 at 485 (April 9, 1992).
260. Id. (citing 1992 Guidelines § 2).
261. Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1559, at 404:1 (Apr. 2, 1992).
262. Id. at 404:2.
263. Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1560, at 486 (citing 1992 Guidelines § 1.3).
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Among market participants, the 1992 Guidelines include all current producers or sellers of the relevant product, even vertically
integrated firms producing only for their own internal consumption, as well as the producers or sellers of recycled or reconditioned
goods and three forms of uncommitted entrants.26 4
The new guidelines retain the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index2 6
(the HHI) to assess market concentration. They abandon the
"likely to sue" formulation, however, which the HHI has represented in the past. Rather, the 1992 Guidelines stress that market
concentration will be taken into account along with other factors
set forth in the guidelines.2"'
One significant change in the 1992 Guidelines is the chapter en267
titled "Potential Adverse Competitive Effects of Mergers,
which attempts to articulate more clearly the anticompetitive effects, involving both collusion and unilateral activity, that mergers
may cause. As Mr. Rill noted, this reflects a recognition "that it is
conduct, not structure, that causes anticompetitive effects, al26 8
though structure can influence the likely effect of conduct.
Another change is the expanded chapter on "Entry Analysis, 2 69
which establishes a three-part framework focusing on the timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency of entry alternatives. This analysis
helps assess the probability that a merger's potential anticompetitive effects will be offset by post-merger entry into the market.
The final two chapters on "Efficiencies '270 and "Failure of Existing Assets"' 27 1 have been revised to indicate that the government
has diminished hostility to these defenses. For example, efficiencies
need no longer be proven by "clear and convincing evidence," a
higher standard than other elements of the analysis. Additionally,
the government ostensibly intends to take a more neutral approach
on the failing company defense than the skeptical approach taken
in past years.2 72
264. Id.
265. The HHI is an arithmetic measure of market concentration derived by summing the
squares of the market shares of participants in the relevant market.
266. Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1560, at 486 (citing 1992 Guidelines § 1.3).
267. 1992 Guidelines, supra note 253, at S-8.
268. Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1560, at 487.
269. 1992 Guidelines, supra note 253, at S-11 to S-12.
270. Id. at S-13.
271. Id.
272. Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1559, at 404:2.
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FTC Enforcement Activity

The FTC was not as active in Virginia this year as it has been in
the past. In the only reported action, FTC v. Voices for Freedom, 273 the FTC entered into a consent judgment, approved by the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
permanently enjoining telemarketer William von Meister, former
president of Phone Base Systems, Inc., from misrepresenting the
nonprofit nature of any organization for which he conducts marketing and the percentage of proceeds of any such promotion that
will ultimately reach any charity or non-profit organization. 27 4 The
agreement was reached with Mr. von Meister to settle charges arising out of an action filed by the FTC alleging deceptive
telemarketing of "Desert Shield/Desert Storm" bracelets sold by
an Alexandria-based company called Voices for Freedom. The
FTC's charges against Voices for Freedom and its principals are
still pending.
D.

Administrative Debarment Upheld

In Leitman v. McAusland,27 5 the Fourth Circuit refused to overturn an administrative decision debarring the appellant from
purchasing surplus and foreign excess personal property from the
federal government for three years. The court found there was substantial evidence to support collusive bidding charges upon which
the hearing officer's decision was based.
IV.

CIVIL ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF VIRGINIA

This past year the Antitrust and Consumer Litigation Section of
the Virginia Attorney General's Office followed up a Norfolk federal grand jury investigation by filing a civil suit on behalf of
thirty-five school districts in Tidewater and central Virginia
against five dairies. Settlements were reached with two dairies and
suit was dismissed against a third.
The suit filed by the Attorney General is Virginia v. Embassy
Dairy, Inc.2 76 It names as defendants Embassy Dairy, Inc., Land273.
274.
275.
276.

No. 91-1542-A (E.D. Va. Apr. 6, 1992).
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 23,167, at 22,833 (Apr. 14, 1992).
934 F.2d 46, 52 (4th Cir. 1991).
No. 91-510-N (E.D. Va. 1991).
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0-Sun Dairies, Inc. t/a Pet Dairy, Maola Milk & Ice Cream Company, Inc., Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers Cooperative Association, Inc. t/a Marva Maid Dairy, and The Southland Corporation. The first amended complaint alleges that beginning as early
as 1983 and through 1991, defendants conspired to rig school milk
bids and allocate contracts in violation of Sherman Act section 1
and section 59.1-9.5 of the Virginia Antitrust Act. Recognizing potential problems with the applicable four year statute of limitations, the complaint also alleges that defendants engaged in fraudulent concealment of their allegedly illegal activities.
In another enforcement proceeding, the settlement between
Nintendo and the Virginia Attorney General's Office concerning an
alleged resale price maintenance scheme involving Nintendo's Entertainment System eight-bit video game consoles, reported in last
year's Antitrust Law Survey,
received final approval from the
District Court for the Southern District of New York. Approval
was given despite the continued objection of some California plaintiffs to the content of the notices to be published nationwide advis27 9
ing consumers of the settlement.
V.

A.

FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY

Federal Legislation

1. Status of Price Fixing Prevention Act of 1991
The only significant legislative development this past year in the
federal antitrust area was the passage of the Price Fixing Prevention Act of 1991 (the Act), 280 by the House of Representatives on
October 10, 1991. The bill (1) would codify the per se illegality rule
277. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint at 17, Virginia v. Embassy Dairy, Inc., No. 91510-N (E.D. Va. 1991). The suit has resulted in settlements with Maola and the Southland
Corporation. As part of its settlement entered into on May 29, 1992, Southland has agreed
to pay $379,021.00 in damages for overcharging on milk, as well as $100,000 in attorney's
fees and costs. Litigation involving Land-O-Sun is stalled pending the resolution of bankruptcy proceedings in Florida, No. 91-617-3P-1 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991), and Embassy Dairy
has been dismissed from the case on summary judgment. See discussion Virginia v. Embassy
Dairy, Inc., No. 91-510-N, (E.D. Va. Mar. 25, 1992). Trial against the sole remaining defendant, Marva Maid, was scheduled to begin July 1, 1992.
278. See Michael F. Urbanski, Antitrust and Trade Regulation Law: Annual Survey of
Virginia Law, 25 U. RIcH. L. REv. 565, 601 (1991).
279. Virginia v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., No. 91-CIV-3943 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 1991) (settlement agreement approved).
280. H.R. 1470, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). See Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1536, at 437 (Oct. 10, 1991) for the House Judiciary Committee Report on the Act.
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for vertical price fixing, other than for maximum prices, (2) establish a market power defense to resale price maintenance claims,
and (3) modify the Supreme Court's decisions in Monsanto v.
Spray-Rite Service Corp.2"' and Business Electronics Corp. v.
Sharp Electronics Corp.28 2 Those decisions would be modified by
allowing a terminated dealer to now reach the jury if he provides
evidence of "substantial causation," as defined by the Act, which
would raise an inference of illegal concerted action. The legislation
has been sent to conference to be reconciled with the United
States Senate's version contained in the Consumer Protection
Against Price-Fixing Act of 1991,283 passed on May 9, 1991. President Bush is expected to veto the legislation.
2.

Sentencing Guidelines Amended

On November 1, 1991, new amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines mandated for use by United States district courts
became effective. A new chapter was included in the guidelines addressing the topic of the sentencing of organizations. The guidelines contained in this chapter are based upon the notion that the
culpability of an organization should be governed primarily by the
steps taken by it, prior to the offense, to prevent and detect criminal conduct. Thus, the guidelines place a premium on effective,
consistently maintained antitrust compliance programs.2 84
B.

State Legislation

1.

Consumer Protection Legislation

The Virginia General Assembly has modified current comparison
price advertising criminal statutes and enacted the Comparison
Price Advertising Act,2 5 which will be enforced under the Virginia
Consumer Protection Act.28 6
281. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
282. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
283. S. 429, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); see Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1515, at 652:1 (May 9, 1991).
284. 56 Fed. Reg. 22786-97 (May 16, 1991).
285. Act of Apr. 5, 1992, cb. 768, 1992 Va. Acts 1191 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1207.40 to -207.44)).
286. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-196 to -207 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
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Franchise Legislation

The fees under the Virginia Retail Franchising Act 28 ' have been
increased from two-hundred and fifty to five hundred dollars for
filing an application for registration of a franchise, from one hundred and fifty to two hundred and fifty dollars for filing an application for renewal, and from fifty to one hundred dollars for
amending a registration. These increases take effect July 1, 1992.
VI.

CONCLUSION

While most of the past year's antitrust jurisprudence in Virginia
saw only fortification of well-defined doctrinal obstacles to plaintiffs' prosecution of antitrust claims, the United States Supreme
Court's opinion in Kodak, as well as statutory and regulatory
changes at the federal level, has signaled a potential shift of direction in several areas of antitrust law. It remains to be seen, however, how Virginia's federal and state courts will react to these developments - as foot-dragging followers or as groundbreaking
leaders.

287. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-561(d) (Cum. Supp. 1992).

